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INTRODUCTION

Since first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in 1812,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been followed by courts
that have "waived jurisdiction over certain activities of foreign
sovereigns," foreclosing the possibility that a plaintiff may obtain redress from a transcontinental defendant located far from
the American courtroom. 1 Marshall's words became the basic
t J.D. Pace University School of Law, 2007; B.A. Boston College, cum laude,
History and Economics. I would like to thank my parents, Philip and Mary, for
their continuous love, support and generosity and my beloved grandmother, Dina
Puiatti, for her incessant inspiration. A special thank you to the editors and associates of P.I.L.R. for their hard work and careful eyes in editing this piece.

1 Verlinden v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
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jurisprudence for the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity.
His theory of absolute immunity placed the decisions concerning a foreign nation's immunity within the province of the Executive Branch, specifically delegating to the State Department
2
the task of issuing suggestions of immunity where appropriate.
The Chief Justice explained that "as a matter of comity, members of the international community had implicitly agreed to
waive the exercise of jurisdiction over other sovereigns in certain classes of cases." 3 His words elucidated the original rationale behind the theory of absolute sovereign immunity: the
Executive Branch's control over decisions of immunity was necessary because of the "significant implications" a grant or denial
of immunity may have on the United States' relationship with
4
foreign nations.
A recent case, initially brought within the Texas state
courts and subsequently removed to the federal system, named
Pope Benedict XVI as a defendant in an action arising from the
alleged sexual abuse of three minors by Roman Catholic clergy. 5
This case was not brought against a foreign state, but rather,
only its head of state. The case, therefore, implicates another
issue of the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, namely,
whether it applies to foreign heads of state. The three plaintiffs
claimed that as the leader of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope
Benedict XVI, who at the time of the alleged abuse was known
as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, "designed and explicitly directed
a conspiracy to fraudulently conceal tortious conduct." 6 The
case raised the preliminary jurisdictional question of whether
the Pope, as head of state for the Holy See, should remain a part
of this lawsuit. The particulars of this suit highlight the continuously debated issues of when, if at all, a foreign head of state
may be subject to the jurisdiction of a United States court and
how suits involving heads of states should be resolved, in light
2 See A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affg sub
nom. Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).
3 Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004).
4 See Zemin, 383 F.3d at 627.
5 See Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Pope Wants Head-of-State Immunity from
Texas Suit, TExAs LAWYER, Sept. 9, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
newswire-article.jsp?id= 1126083917974.
6 Id.
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of the governing principles behind the foreign sovereign immu7
nity doctrine.
The United States, along with various other nations, currently adheres to a doctrine of restrictive immunity, which permits courts to withhold immunity from foreign states for acts
that are commercial or non-public in nature.8 The 1976 Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 9 reflects the transformation
from an absolute foreign sovereign immunity theory to a restrictive immunity theory. 10 The codification of Marshall's sovereign immunity concept recognizes that when determinining
whether immunity should be granted, a distinction exists between a sovereign's public acts taken on behalf of the state and
those acts that are primarily private and lack any nexus attributable to statehood." Previously, the executive and the judiciary answered questions regarding sovereign immunity
alternately.12 By placing the determination of foreign sovereign
immunity solely within the Judicial Branch, as distinguished
from head of state immunity decisions, the FSIA creates a jurisdictional bar for litigants in the international legal arena. A
plaintiff cannot make use of the domestic courts for redress
against a foreign sovereign because subject matter jurisdiction
is statutorily divested unless the sovereign's acts fall within the
statutory exceptions. 13 However, what appears to be a simple
device that clarifies when claims brought against a foreign state
will be immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts is
less clear when applied to determine whether claims which
name a foreign nation's head-of-state as a defendant will be
granted immunity. Moreover, Congress' 1976 decision to codify
7 See, e.g., Erin M. Callan, In re Mr. and Mrs. Doe: Witnesses Before the
Grand Jury and the Head of State Immunity Doctrine, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
117, 128 (1989); Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State
Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (1986); Shobha
Varguese George, Head of State Immunity in the United States Courts: Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051 (1999).
S See generally 48 C.J.S. International Law § 39 (2005); CHRISTOPH H.
SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2-9 (Grotius Publications Ltd. 1988).
9 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1602, 90
Stat. 2891 (1998).
10 See Schreuer, supra note 8, at 2.
11 See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688-91 (2004).
12 See Callan, supra note 7, at 128.
13 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (2005).
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sovereign immunity and, in turn, strip the State Department
from its role in answering the jurisdictional question for foreign
states, left uncertain the issue of whether heads-of-states are
included within this statutory scheme.
A residuary issue that has been raised by courts concerns
the binding effect on the judiciary of the State Department's
suggestion of immunity since no provision in the FSIA discusses
head of state immunity. 14 United States v. Noriega,1 5 decided
by the Eleventh Circuit, highlights this question. The court
noted that, absent a position from the Executive Branch on
whether head of state immunity should be granted, the head of
state's challenge to the lower court's denial of immunity "likely
would not prevail even if this court had to make an independent
determination regarding the propriety of immunity in this
case."1 6 Noriega and subsequent cases denying immunity for
heads of state suggest that the shield of immunity may be denied where the underlying cause of action is based on the head
of state's role in grave human rights offenses, what are consid17
ered non-public acts.
In the context of foreign sovereign immunity, the FSIA no
longer adheres to a theory of absolute sovereign immunity and
allows for jurisdiction over claims that are based on actions that
are non-public in nature. When determining whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists over claims involving a foreign sovereign, courts reach their conclusions by distinguishing between
the public and private acts that the sovereign has taken and
finding if those non-public actions that form the basis of a plaintiffs claims fall within the FSIA's enumerated exceptions to immunity. 8 However, after the enactment of the FSIA, there
2003), affg sub
14 See A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill.
nom. Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004).
15 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
16 Id.

at 1212.

17 See, e.g., Michael A. Tunks, Diplomatsor Defendants Defining the Futureof
Head-of-State Immunity, 52 DuKE L.J. 651, 659-62 (2002) (noting a trend among
courts to abrogate immunity for sitting world leaders charged with serious international offenses); Amber Fitzgerald, The Pinochet Case: Head of State Immunity
within the United States, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 987, 1014-17 (2001) (discussing the
exceptional cases where the U.S. denied immunity based on the status of the head
of state and the offense charged).
18 See, e.g., Leutwyler v. Office of Her Majesty Queen Rania Al-Abdullah, 184
F. Supp. 2d 277, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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remains no similarly clear analysis for the resolution of whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists over a claim that specifically
involves a foreign head-of-state. The recent case against the
Pope brings to light the issue of whether the question of head of
state immunity should continue to be resolved solely by adherence to an absolute theory of immunity, which is inconsistent
with the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity behind the
FSIA. This Comment shows how, following the guidelines of a
restrictive theory of head of state immunity, the requisite tools
already exist for the judiciary to resolve head of state immunity
claims were the FSIA to contain a separate exception applicable
to heads-of-state.
Part II of this Comment traces the development of foreign
sovereign immunity and the derivation of head of state immunity. Part III extensively examines cases which have named
foreign heads of state as defendants. This section considers the
types of claims brought against heads of state and the circumstances that prompted the State Department to issue a suggestion of immunity. This part also reviews cases which have
named foreign governmental officials and individuals as defendants and explores those factors that were significant to the
court's determination of whether such individuals should remain a part of the lawsuit. It further suggests that the analysis
followed by the courts in discussing whether claims brought
against foreign governmental individuals are actionable provides guidance for how claims involving foreign heads of states
can similarly be resolved by the judiciary. In the context of sovereign immunity, this section additionally examines cases that
have denied sovereign immunity to foreign states falling under
the discretionary function exception of the FSIA.
Part IV focuses on the most recent case against Pope Benedict XVI and the claims brought against him as head of the Holy
See. This part discusses the arguments raised by the plaintiffs
to support a finding of subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims brought against the Pope as head of state. This section
explores the need to clarify head of state immunity case law and
align the resolution of head of state immunity claims with the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity evidenced in
the FSIA. In addition, this part explores how courts are well
suited to determine if subject matter jurisdiction exists over a

5

500

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 18:495

claim brought against a foreign head of state by looking to the
gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint, considering the nature of
the claim, and determining whether the actions were taken on
behalf of his official duties. Part V proposes that, in light of the
uncertainty surrounding head of state immunity, the FSIA
should include a separate exception for heads of state that
would provide, when circumstances warrant, subject matter jurisdiction over a head of state immunity claim.
II.

HISTORY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND HEAD OF

STATE IMMUNITY

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 197619
statutorily codified Congress' intent that it remains for the determination of United States courts to adjudicate the claims of
foreign states and consider whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists over such claims. 20 This decision to vest courts with the
authority to determine foreign sovereign immunity was reached
by Congress so as to "serve the interests of justice and protect
the rights of both foreign states and litigants." 2 1 However, the
final product of the FSIA involved crafting a statute that would
neither detrimentally interfere with foreign relations nor risk
embarrassment to the executive arm's conduct of foreign affairs. 22 The FSIA's enactment would have to effectively coordinate these principles so as not to upset relations within the
international community.
Under the earlier doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity,
the pre-FSIA concept that a king could commit no wrong that
could cause the "exercise of authority by one sovereign over another" was consistently adhered to by American courts. 23 The
absolute theory of foreign sovereignty permitted foreign states
to enjoy immunity from all suits in federal courts. 24 The Executive Branch alone, through suggestions of immunity issued by
the State Department, determined whether a foreign nation
19 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1602, 90
Stat. 2891 (1998).
20 See id.
21 Id.
22 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 699 (1976).
23 See Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastechimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964).
24 See George, supra note 7, at 1057.
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was entitled to immunity. When a suit was issued, the courts
would dismiss the suit and all claims against the foreign nation. 25 To subject a foreign sovereign to the jurisdiction of a nation's courts outside of its own territory was held to unduly
degrade the dignity of the foreign sovereign's nation and blemish the sovereign's absolute independence among other nations. 26 Thus, sovereign immunity was believed to remain
27
outside the scope of the judiciary.
Although the doctrine appears simple in its theory and application, developments of the twentieth century engendered a
movement away from absolute sovereign immunity toward the
adoption of restrictive sovereign immunity. 28 When Chief Justice John Marshall first addressed the concept of sovereign immunity in the SchoonerExchange,29 his reasoning was based on
the proposition that a foreign sovereign may carry out both public and private duties. 3 0 The issue that the Schooner Exchange
case addressed in 1812 was "whether an American citizen can
assert, in an American court, a title to an armed national vessel, found within the waters of the United States."3 1 Where the
behavior of the sovereign involved purposes of trade, he noted
"a clear distinction is to be drawn between the rights accorded
to private individuals or private trading vessels, and those accorded to public armed ships which constitute a part of the military force of the nation."3 2 It was this distinction between
governmental or public sovereign acts versus private acts that
was recognized after World War II when the United States restricted immunity to those nations with whom it had negotiated
treaties that obligated each contracting party "to waive its sovereign immunity for state-controlled enterprises engaged in
business activities within the territory of the other party."3 3
The creation of these treaties indicated the beginning of the
25 See A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Il. 2003), af/g sub
nom. Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2004).
26 See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812).
27 Id.

28 See generally Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).

29 See Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 147.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 135.
32 Id. at 143.
33 Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastechimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964).
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United States' commitment to a restrictive theory of immunity
which would no longer grant immunity to a foreign sovereign
when its actions were not related to "state-controlled" matters
and, thus, were private or commercial in nature.
In 1952, the Acting Legal Advisor for the Secretary of
State, Jack B. Tate, issued a letter ("Tate Letter") that defined
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and certified its
relevance to the growing economy. 34 He expanded on the principle that individuals engaged in transactions with foreign sovereigns should be entitled to a judicial remedy when their rights
are hindered by a sovereign's commercial activities. 35 The Tate
Letter marked the United States' movement away from the theory of absolute sovereign immunity, but left much confusion regarding the deference that courts were to give the State
36
Department's immunity suggestion.
The courts, however, continued to defer to State Department determinations even though this deference led to inconsistent outcomes and made the application of the restrictive theory
appear impractical.3 7 Moreover, since the restrictive theory
was not yet enacted into law, the courts, without any statutory
guidelines, were left with the difficult task of drawing the line
between a foreign state's immune and non-immune activities.
When nations failed to directly request immunity from the
State Department, the immunity issue was left to be resolved
by courts, which lacked case law precedent and could answer
this jurisdictional question only by reference to prior State Department decisions, if any similar decisions existed. 38 As a result of this uncertainty, Congress was prompted to pass the
FSIA. The FSIA was created to rectify the dangerous condition
of "sovereign immunity determinations ...[being] made in two
different branches." 39 Codifying the common law of sovereign
immunity solved Congress' concern that the State Department
34 See Callan, supra note 7, at 126.
35 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
36 See Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp.

Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 714 (1976).
2d 907, 912 (N.D. Ill.
2003), aff'd, 408

F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
37 See id. (discussing how the history of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, in practice, was troublesome).
38 See Schreuer, supra note 8, at 2-7; see also Verlinden v. Cent. Bank of Nig.,
461 U.S. 480 (1983).
39 Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004).
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was "in the awkward position of a political institution trying to
40
apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts."
After passage of the FSIA, a private citizen was able to avail
himself of the privilege of having his dispute with a foreign sovereign determined by the courts.
Due to the FSIA, the government was initially freed from
the case-by-case diplomatic pressures associated with granting
immunity to a sovereign after 1976. The judiciary was vested
with a set of guidelines and "legal standards governing claims
of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its
political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities."4 1 Under
the restrictive view of immunity incorporated into the current
FSIA, commercial transactions with foreign sovereigns do not
42
render them immune from adjudication in American courts.
As a result, the fear that subjecting sovereigns to an assessment of the legality of their governmental acts is lessened, as
"[in their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not
exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns." 4 3 This rationale, integrated within the FSIA, is based on the concept that because
private individuals can engage in such acts, subjecting a foreign
sovereign to the judiciary of another sovereign does not impede
44
foreign relations.
Presently, the FSIA is the sole basis for invoking subject
matter jurisdiction over a foreign state in American courts. 4 5
Under the FSIA, a foreign state is presumptively immune from
Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095,1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
42 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2). This section provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case in which the action is based on a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
on an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or on an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
40
41

Id.
43 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976).

Id. at 704.
See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989) (discussing how a court obtains subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
states).
44
45
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jurisdiction unless one of the statutory exceptions is satisfied. 46
A plaintiff, asserting a cause of action against a foreign sovereign, must initially plead the non-immunity of the foreign state
and raise the issue of immunity. 47 In its responsive pleading,
the foreign state bears the burden of proof to present a prima
facie showing of immunity. 48 The burden then shifts back to
the plaintiff to rebut the foreign sovereign's claim of immunity. 49 Once the plaintiff offers evidence that an exception applies, the foreign sovereign must overcome the exception
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that immunity is
warranted. 50 Although the statute serves as a broad shield of
immunity for foreign states, the language provides for numerous exceptions that may pierce the shield and create subject
matter jurisdiction based on a party's claim against a foreign
state.
Courts consider claims arising from the foreign state's commercial activity as the broadest exception to sovereign immunity. The FSIA appears to "manifest[ ] a preoccupation with the
commercial activities of foreign states and a concern with granting 'access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes[.]"'5 1 Due to the powerfulness of the FSIA to convey
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state,
52
complete satisfaction of the statutory criteria is crucial.
Commercial activity, non-commercial tortious activity, and
waiver of immunity by the foreign state itself are the primary
exceptions under the FSIA providing subject matter jurisdiction
over claims brought against a foreign state.5 3 The commercial
54
activity exception is the broadest exception under the FSIA.
46 Joseph Dellapenna, Refining the Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 WILLAMETTE
J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RESOL. 57, 68 (2001) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Refining the
Sovereign Immunities Act].

See id.
See id.
49 Id.
47
48

50 45 AM. JUR. 2D INT'L L § 113 (2005).

51 Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affd, 408
F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Alicog v. Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382
(S.D. Tex. 1994) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604 , 6605).
52 See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004).
53 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A § 1605 (1982); see also Dellapenna, Refining the Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 46, at 67.
54 See Alicog v. Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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Specifically, § 1605(a)(2) provides that a foreign state is not immune in any case "in which the action is based on a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state."55
In full, the exception continues that a foreign state shall not be
immune from jurisdiction where such act is "performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or on an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States." 5 6 The FSIA exceptions apply to the state, its
political subdivision, agencies, or instrumentalities.5 7 However,
what is absent from the statute is whether the statute as a
whole, or its exceptions, applies to resolve the status of a foreign
sovereign's head of state immunity.
Numerous scholars, as well as those from the bench, have
commented that much confusion plagues the current standing
of head of state immunity under the FSIA.58 The courts have
continuously questioned whether the judiciary's determination
of a foreign sovereign's immunity under the FSIA brings within
their authority the determination of a head of state's immunity.5 9 In contrast to the codified exceptions to sovereign immunity, the status of head of state immunity is a murky area.
Historically, the doctrine of comity has often been cited as the
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2). The non-commercial tortious activity exception
provides that a foreign state shall not be immune where:
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his
office of employment.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2).
57 Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign and Individual Immunities
(Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and DiplomaticImmunity) - Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INr'L & COMP. L. 467, 469-70 (1999).
58 See George, supra note 7, at 1061; 3 David K. Pansius, TRANSNATIONAL Bus.
TRANSACTIONS § 15:3 (Aug. 2005) (questioning whether the FSIA left intact the
State Department's ability to effect immunity for sovereign officials); see also In re
Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that the scope of head
of state immunity is an amorphous and undeveloped state).
59 See A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affg sub
nom. Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004); Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affd, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005); see also In re
Doe, 860 F. 2d at 40.
55
56
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reasoning behind head of state immunity. 60 As a principle of
international law, the elementary moralistic notion of 'do unto
others as you would have them do to you,' is upheld by nations
out of respect for the legislative, executive, or judicial actions
taken on behalf of another nation. 6 1 Thus, "each state protects
the immunity concept so that its own head-of-state will be protected when he or she is abroad." 6 2 Were a head of state's immunity revoked, the more private and personal degradation of a
sovereign's leader is at risk,for it is a "matter of grace and comity rather than a constitutional requirement" that heads of
63
state not submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign nation's courts.
Further, due to the grave political consequences attending head
of state immunity, courts concede that "recognition of a government and its officers is the exclusive function of the Executive
Branch."6 4 Some courts maintain that it is not part of the judiciary's authority to make such a decision because the "conflict
between individual private rights and interests of international
comity are better resolved by the executive, rather than by judi'6 5
cial decision.
When faced with the unsettled issue of bestowing a head of
state with immunity, the "cornerstones of foreign sovereign immunity, comity and the mutual dignity of nations" remain the
important principles upheld by courts assessing this jurisdictional question. 6 6 Unfortunately, these cornerstones are not
sufficient to establish a consensus concerning when a head of
state will be immune and the head of state immunity doctrine
lacks the clarity of statutory codification when this issue is
presented to the courts. As a result, the current status of head
of state immunity is similar to the period prior to the codification of sovereign immunity. Furthermore, decisions have been
60 See In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45; LaFontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
61 See Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 132.
62 Id.
63 See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004).
64 Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (discussing the concept

of absolute immunity in light of head of state immunity and the principles of comity and mutual
respect among nations).
65 In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45; see also A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d
875 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affg sub nom. Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).
66 Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff'd, 408
F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
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produced that are a hybrid of the Executive Branch's suggestion
and the standards and procedures "outlined in the Schooner Exchange and its progeny." 6 7 During recent years, various factors
have been raised by plaintiffs seeking to refute a head of state's
immunity, such as whether the cause of action against the head
of state arose during his tenure as a sovereign leader, whether
the claim itself charges a crime against humanity, torture, or
another international offense, and whether the cause of action
is related to a non-governmental function. 68 When considering
such arguments, courts have noted that "[alt common law,
heads of state enjoyed absolute immunity from all suits, except
perhaps those arising from a head of state's personal commercial ventures." 69 This reasoning is applicable under the FSIA to
foreign sovereign states that may lose their immunity when the
claims brought against the sovereign state are based on its nonpublic actions. Perhaps, the status of a foreign head of state's
immunity could become better defined if the courts were able to
address claims against heads of state by following a restrictive
head of state immunity doctrine as enumerated in a separate
exception under the FSIA.
III.

CURRENT HEADS OF STATE CASE LAW

As the Seventh Circuit recently noted in Abubakar,70 "[a]
courtroom in Chicago... is an unlikely place for considering a
case involving seven Nigerian citizens suing an eighth Nigerian
for acts committed in Nigeria."'7 1 The Seventh Circuit's role in
serving as the medium to adjudicate such a claim addressed the
primary issue raised on appeal: whether the FSIA applied to
"individuals connected with the government, as opposed to the
state itself, and its agencies." 7 2 The Abubakar court's remarks
67 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nayyan 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1119 (D.D.C. 1996)(addressing
the issue of whether the enactment of the FSIA was intended to affect the power of
the State Department to assess immunity for heads of state); Leutwsyler, 184 F.
Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(discussing the impact of the Suggestion on Immunity filed on behalf of the Queen).
68 See, e.g., Zemin, 383 F.3d at 626; Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 916; Tunks,
supra note 17, at 659-60.
69 Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
70 Abubakar, 408 F.3d at 878.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 881.
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illustrate that, despite the uncertainty surrounding the head of
state immunity doctrine, certain circumstances such as the
gravity of the plaintiffs claims have prompted courts to engage
in their own interpretations of the FSIA.73 Moreover, without
any guidance from the FSIA itself, it is not uncommon for the
courts to discuss the preliminary issue of whether the court has
jurisdiction to hear claims involving a foreign sovereign's head
of state when those claims are based on allegations of torture,
cruel and inhuman treatment, or wrongful death.
Courts responding to this jurisdictional question of a head
of state's immunity may consider where the foreign individual
named as a defendant and the type of claim brought against
such person fall within the FSIA, if at all. For example, in
Abubakar, the plaintiffs' causes of action charged Nigeria's
head of state with the torture and killing of various Nigerian
citizens at the hands of the nation's military junta.7 4 One plaintiff, Hafsat Abiola, was the daughter of a pro-democracy activist. 75 She claimed that her father won the Nigerian
presidential election in 1993 but the military regime nullified
the election results.7 6 He was subsequently arrested and
charged with treason after he declared himself president in
1994. The defendant, General Abubakar, assumed control of
the military regime in 1998. Particularly unique to the circumstances of the case was the fact that a true head of state failed
to exist throughout the various military regimes that remained
in control of the country between 1983 and 1999. No official
leader personally ran the country during the time period when
the plaintiff was subject to torture, arbitrary detention, and
cruel and inhumane treatment. 7 7 However, the defendant
moved for immunity on the grounds that he was a Nigerian
public official and his acts were official conduct taken while he
78
served as a member of the ruling council.
73 See generallyAbubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907; Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 129;
Tachonia, 186 F. Supp. 2d 383; Zemin, 383 F.3d 620; In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
74 Abubakar, 408 F.3d at 878-80.
75 Id. at 879.
76 Id.
77 Id.

78 Id. at 880.
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The defendant contended, using the FSIA's definitional
§ 1603(a) 79 for support, that a "separate legal person" includes
an individual.8 0 The court had to consider if Congress meant to
include individuals acting within the scope of their official capacities under the FSIA, having no suggestion of immunity
from the State Department because of the lack of a definitive
Nigerian leader.8 1 The court ultimately concluded that the
FSIA did not apply to General Abubakar.8 2 This conclusion was
reached after the court engaged in strict statutory analysis of
the FSIA's language in § 1603(a). The court held that, because
the exceptions to immunity were created in the context of distinguishing a foreign sovereign's commercial activity, the placement of the term "separate legal person" near "corporate or
otherwise" was done to reference corporations as distinct legal
fictions.8 3 In contrast to this court's ruling, the District court
held that since the State Department did not deny immunity,
Abubakar should be entitled to immunity for his acts only dur84
ing the period he actually served as Nigeria's head of state.
This immunity extended only to plaintiffs claims that arose
during this limited period. Although this ruling was overturned
on appeal, the District Court's finding suggests that the privilege of head of state immunity should be limited only to those
acts where the head of state acted in his official capacity.
The Ninth Circuit similarly recognized the distinction that
exists between a governmental individual acting solely within
79 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a). This section defines FSIA a foreign state as follows
for the purposes of FSIA:
(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third

country.
Id.
80 See Abubakar, 408 F.3d at 881.
81 Id. at 882.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 881.
84 Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
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his official capacities and his actions taken outside of those duties.85 In Park v. Shin,8 6 the court addressed the issue of
whether the defendant, who at the time of the suit served as the
Deputy Consul General of the Republic of Korea Consulate General in San Francisco, and his wife were entitled to immunity
under the FSIA.8 7 The basis of the plaintiffs complaint included both federal and state statutory claims, as well as common law claims that arose from her employment as the
defendant's domestic servant.8 8 The defendant asserted that he
qualified as a "foreign state" under the FSIA and was therefore
entitled to immunity. 9 The plaintiff contended that the statutory bar did not apply to her claims because the defendant was
"not acting within the scope of his official duties when he committed the acts." 90
The court held that not all acts undertaken by individual
government employees are covered under the FSIA. 9 1 Rather,
the court used a number of factors to determine whether an individual was acting in an official capacity and fell within the
FSIA's protection. These factors included a consideration of
whether the official purported to act as an individual and not an
official, whether the cause of action against the official is a disguised action against the representative nation, and whether
the action, if allowed to proceed against the official, would interfere with the sovereign state. 9 2 The Ninth Circuit found that
the mere action of hiring the plaintiff as his domestic servant
was not taken "exclusively or even primarily as an agent of the
Republic of Korea. '9 3 Moreover, such factors, including the fact
that the defendant paid the plaintiff from his family funds and
required her to work within the Consulate for only a few days
each month, did not trigger the FSIA's immunity bar. 94
85 See Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2002).

86 See id. at 1140.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1140-41.
89 Id. at 1141.
90 Id. at 1143.
91 Id. at 1144.
92 Id.
93 Id.

94 See id. at 1144-46.
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In another case that concerned the applicability of the FSIA
to an "individual," a photographer residing in the United States
brought suit against a royal head of state, Queen Rania AlAbdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.9 5 The claims
brought against the Queen and the Office of Her Majesty in- '
cluded defamation, breach of contract, and copyright infringement. The claims all arose as a result of the plaintiffs
photography of the Royal Family in Jordan and a contract
which granted the plaintiff usage rights of any photos taken.9 6
After the photos were taken, the plaintiff alleged that they appeared in a publication issued on behalf of the Royal Family
without his permission.9 7 In addition, Leut alleged that the office of Her Majesty interfered with his right to use the pictures
of the Royal Family in good faith and that they made false allegations to both magazines claiming the plaintiff improperly
used the photos. 98 The court deferred to the United States government's suggestion of immunity for her Majesty, but still at
issue before the court was whether, as the defendants contended, subject matter jurisdiction existed over the claims
brought against the named agents of the Queen's Office. 9 9 The
court addressed the issue by first asking whether the individual
defendants acted "within [their] official capacities during the
events that gave rise to [the] action" because the FSIA provides
no immunity for acts that exceed the scope of one's official capacities. 10 0 The court stated that the nature of the individual's
actions, rather than the alleged motives, is of great importance
in distinguishing between official and personal actions. 10 1 The
actions that formed the basis of plaintiffs complaint, namely
the Queen's office official's oversight of the Queen's public image and all press-related matters, were found to be done in furofficial duties and, thus, did not pierce the
therance of their
"public" veil.' 0 2 Furthermore, the court found that "whether or
95 Leutwyler v. Office of Her Majesty Queen Rania, 184 F. Supp. 2d 277
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
96 Leutwyler, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
97 Id. 282-83.
98 Id. at 283-84.
99 Id. at 280.
at 287.

100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.

at 288.
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not the photographing of the Royal family... was arranged in
the Royal Family's capacity as private citizens[;] . . .once the
photos were sought to be injected into the international media,
they [became] of public and, therefore, official import."'10 3
Therefore, these individual defendants were found to fall within
the FSIA's class of "foreign states" after the court carefully analyzed the relationship between their public and private duties
and the nexus that existed between these roles and the basis of
the plaintiffs complaint.
A.

Types of Claims Against Heads of State

Along with "who" falls under the FSIA, the question of
"what" claims underlie a plaintiffs suit is significant in determining when the court has subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against a foreign head of state. Where the claim may
involve some violation ofjus cogens,'0 4 courts seek to determine
whether such an action taken on behalf of the head of state
bears any connection to the head of state's official duties. 0 5 For
example, the Seventh Circuit, in Ye v. Zemin, 10 6 faced the issue
of determining whether a suggestion of immunity from the Executive Branch was binding.10 7 The court deferred to the suggestion of immunity and reasoned that the State Department's
conclusion accounted for the "significant implications for this
country's relationships with other nations.' ' 0 8 Although the alleged claims against the head of state President Jiang of China
included primarily those ofjus cogens violations such as torture,
genocide, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, the court recognized that by allowing the Executive Branch alone to resolve
the immunity decision, these grave actions were accounted for
by the Executive Branch's decision to issue a suggestion letId.
Jus cogens is defined as international norms.
105 See Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 1023-28 (highlighting the case against Pinochet and the fact that torture could not be considered an official act); see also A,
B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affg sub nom.Ye v.
Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the plaintiffs argument that
in at least a particular class of cases, a court cannot defer to the position of the
Executive Branch, for example those cases involving violations of jus cogens
norms).
106 See Zemin, 383 F.3d at 620.
107 See id.
108 See id.
103
104
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ter. 10 9 In dicta, the court highlighted that a violation of jus
cogens norms was a distinction that failed to be taken into account under the FSIA, as it was not a statutory exception
whereby a foreign sovereign may be subject to jurisdiction. 1 0
The Zemin court was unwilling to supersede the Executive
Branch's authority to address the immunity issue but, as indicated by the court's reasoning, the court recognized the possibility that the type of claim brought against a head of state could
affect whether subject matter jurisdiction may be found.
Similarly, in United States v. Noriega,1 the Eleventh Circuit also recognized that since foreign sovereignty in the criminal context is not specifically addressed in the FSIA, the ability
to determine a head of state's immunity remains vested completely in the Executive Branch. 1 2 However, unlike in Zemin,
the Noriega court went further in responding to the head of
state immunity issue before it. The court reasoned that because
of the Executive Branch's failure to issue a clear suggestion of
immunity and "capture and prosecute" Noriega himself,
Noriega should be denied head of state immunity. 1 3 The court
further stated that had it "ma[d]e an independent determination regarding the propriety of immunity in this case; Noriega's
homeland's failure to request immunity, along with his alleged
acts being linked to his "private pursuit of personal enrichment," would have moved it to assert jurisdiction. 1 4 In reaching its conclusion to deny immunity, the Noriega court itself
interpreted the Executive Branch's action in pursuing a head of
state to return for prosecution and went even further in discussing head of state immunity by expressing how it would rule
were it forced to evaluate the Executive Branch's immunity decision. Thus, the Noriega court's progressive reasoning here
suggests that, despite the uncertainty surrounding the head of
state immunity doctrine, the court was able to recognize the significant factors that it would have to consider in order to resolve
the issue on its own.
109 Id. at 627.
110 Id.
111 See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
112

See id.

113

Id.

114

Id.
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In re Doe first distinguished when a head of state may be
stripped of immunity for not acting solely within his official capacities. 1 15 This case involved an appeal by former Philippine
President Ferdinand Marcos, who served for twenty years as
president of the Philippines. 11 6 In 1988, a federal grand jury in
the United States District Court of the Southern District of New
York indicted Ferdinand and his wife for embezzling large sums
of money that belonged to both the Philippine and United
States government. 1 7 The Marcos refused to obey the subpoenas and, as a result, were held in contempt of the court. Subsequently, the Marcos asked the district court to reconsider its
contempt order and asserted head of state immunity as their
defense for resisting the subpoenas. The court found that the
Philippine government's waiver of whatever head of state immunity the Marcos might have once been entitled to as former
leaders avoided the necessity for a ruling on the merits of their
immunity defense.' 1 8 Although the court did not rule on the
head of state immunity issue, as it recognized the fact that the
Philippine government "clearly and unequivocally" waived the
Marcos' immunity, the court, in its dicta, remarked that the legal status of heads of state exists in a state of uncertainty under
the FSIA. 1 19
The In re Doe court noted that, despite the appropriate role
the Executive Branch serves in defining the scope of head of
state immunity, a court may be left to decide "for itself whether
a head-of-state is or is not entitled to immunity" when lacking
guidance from the Executive Branch. 20 The Marcos' case was
unique because the causes of actions brought against Ferdinand
were based on actions taken after he was no longer a head of
state. Yet, he still sought to invoke the immunity defense and
contended that it applied to a former head of state. This circumstance challenged the idea behind head of state immunity,
namely that "[s]uch immunity is a personal right. It derives
from and remains 'an attribute of state sovereignty."'1 21 The
115 In re Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
116 Id. at 42.
117 Id.

118 See Callan, supra note 7, at 123.
119 See In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 46.
120 Id. at 45.
121 Id.
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court considered the fact that even if Marcos' acts could have
been considered public Marcos was a former head of state and
his previous title would not trigger the foreign policy ramifications were he subjected to jurisdiction. 122 Therefore, if the court
was able to rule on whether the immunity doctrine applied to
Marcos, according to its reasoning it is likely that his status at
the time of the lawsuit as a former head of state would have
moved the court to deny immunity.
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunity: The FSIA's Discretionary
Function Exception and Heads of State
In contrast to the ambiguity that surrounds head of state
immunity decisions, resolution of foreign sovereign immunity is
handled solely by the courts, which will find subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought against a foreign sovereign after
a determination of whether the statutory exceptions to the
FSIA have been satisfied. 123 Courts, in determining what constitutes a commercial activity for purposes of the FSIA, will
likely deny immunity and hold that subject matter jurisdiction
exists over a claim brought against a foreign sovereign where
"[the sovereign] acts in the manner of a private player in the
market." 24 However, where the claim is based on "the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of the where the discretion [is] abused"
or "any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights" then the court will likely dismiss such
claims brought against the foreign sovereign because the stat122 See Callan, supra note 7, at 129.
123 See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101,1105 (D.C. 1994)
(stating that the FSIA "immunizes foreign sovereigns ... from federal court jurisdiction . . . unless the case falls within one of several exceptions specified in the
act").
124 Compare Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1993) (holding that
the ultimate basis for the plaintiffs suit, the personal injuries caused by defendant's intentional wrongs and its negligent failure to warn that such wrongs might
be committed, did not qualify as commercial activity) with Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201
F. Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that the commercial activity exception
was not satisfied and the foreign sovereign state, the Chinese government, was
immune from suit because the basis of the plaintiffs complaint arose out of "an
alleged abuse of China's police power).
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ute provides for immunity. 12 5 Thus, the discretionary function
exception is "the exception to the FSIA's exceptions" and renders immune claims brought against a foreign sovereign if the
claim revolves around the sovereign's performance of a discretionary function. 126 A court, when determining if the sovereign
is executing a discretionary function, is required to ask whether
there was a choice of conduct that was "grounded in social, economic, or political policy."1 27 This provision of the FSIA reflects
the concept of restrictive sovereign immunity: it allows for subject matter jurisdiction over claims that involve a foreign sovereign's non-public function, but maintains immunity for actions
based on a sovereign's discretionary function that are linked to
those taken on behalf of the foreign state.
Case law discussing the discretionary function provision indicates that foreign government officials and individuals are
often named as defendants in suits involving foreign sovereigns. 128 The analysis utilized by the courts in determining
whether the claim falls under the discretionary function exception to the FSIA indicates that whether the claim should proceed will likely depend on the egregiousness of the sovereign's
action, as in case law involving claims brought against a foreign
sovereign that involved a violation of jus cogens or implicated
the sovereign in a criminal context. 129 This analysis may provide guidance for courts to respond to head of state immunity
claims were a restrictive head of immunity doctrine to exist.
30
For example, at issue in Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
was whether the actions taken by the Saudi Arabian Royal
Family fell within the FSIA's discretionary function provision.' 3 ' In Alicog, two former servants of the Saudi Arabian
Royal Family claimed that they were falsely imprisoned and
125 Id.
126 See Maalouf v. The Swiss Confederation, 208 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D.D.C.
2002) (explaining that the FSIA waives jurisdictional immunity for "claims of
money damages for personal injury or death, unless, the case is based on .. . a
discretionary function . . . regardless of whether that discretionary function is
abused") (emphasis added). Id.
127 Id.
128 See, e.g. Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Tex.
1994);
129
130
131

Kline v. Kaneko, 686 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
See supra Part III. A.
See Alicog v. Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
See id. at 382.
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abused while working for the family in Houston, Texas. 13 2 Both
the King and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were named as defendants. The King moved to dismiss on grounds that as head
of state he was immune and the Kingdom moved to dismiss on
grounds that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking under the
FSIA. 133 On the head of state immunity issue, the court recognized that the King was immune because "the United States
has appeared in this action to acknowledge that King Fahd is
the head of state of Saudi Arabia." 13 4 The remaining issue
before the court then was whether Saudi Arabia was immune or
jurisdiction existed over the personal injury claims, which were
caused by government employees acting within the scope of
1 35
their employment.
The Alicog court held that the Saudi Arabian consular officer's assistance in keeping the plaintiffs in the hotel and abusing them would have been an actionable basis for the claim to
proceed under the tort exception to the FSIA, but that immunity existed over these claims because the actions alleged "oc13 6
cur[ed] during the performance of a discretionary function."
In addition, the Alicog court found that the specific action taken
by the Saudi government officials, namely their retention of the
plaintiffs travel papers, qualified as a discretionary function for
it was an "element effectuating policy." 3 7 The passport disputes, which comprised a component of the plaintiffs claim,
were not a matter that required resolution through the judiciary but were best left to the Executive Branch because "judicial
interference with this core of a foreign government's diplomatic
operation is precisely what the FSIA and this country's traditional foreign relations policies are meant to eliminate."' 38
However, the court held that limits exist on what claims fall
under the discretionary function provision.' 3 9 The plaintiffs
charges of imprisonment and abuse were the type of acts that,
132 See Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
133 Id. at 381-82.
134 Id. at 382. It is interesting to note that the court did not go into detail about
the State Department's reasoning as to why the King was immune and only took
as binding the fact that he was a recognized head of state.
135 Id.
136 Alicog, 860 F. Supp. at 382.
137 Id.

138 Id at 382-83.
139 Id. at 383.
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even though they implicated some of a sovereign's action taken
on behalf of the statehood, they were of such kind that they may
140
be considered outside the scope of the discretionary function.
The Alicog court continued that "kidnapping, private imprisonment, and assassination are all beyond the scope of legitimate diplomatic operations and are not protected by the
discretionary function exception." 14 1 Additionally, the court
stated that if the sovereign's consular officers committed "serious criminal acts" such as murder, immunity would not exist as
well. 14 2 Yet, despite the limitations that exist on when a foreign
sovereign will be immune under the discretionary function exception, according to the basis of the plaintiffs complaints in
Alicog, the court found that the Saudi Arabian government did
not exceed the boundaries of discretion by merely detaining the
plaintiffs in the hotel, as the evidence lacked indications of
more egregious acts. 1 4 3 This ruling indicates that, although not
satisfied by the facts at issue in Alicog, a higher bar of illegal
acts is necessary to fall outside the scope of the FSIA's discretionary function exception. Moreover, the Alicog reasoning suggests that, as in the Zemin and Noriega cases discussed above,
where an action is brought against a foreign sovereign that involves a violation of jus cogens, the court will likely find that
immunity is not warranted after determining that such acts are
4
egregious in nature and, thus, wholly non-public acts. 4
IV.

POPE BENEDICT

XVI,

THE JUDICIARY, AND RESOLVING THE

HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

The Vatican and the Holy See are not foreign to the juris45
diction of American Courts. In 1987, English v. Thorne
named the Vatican as a defendant in connection with the alleged tortious conduct towards minors by a Mississippi Catholic
Id.
See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 383 (1993)
142 Id. at 384.
143 Id.
144 Id. Cf. Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding the
discretionary function test was also satisfied where the Secretary of Mexico's enforcement of Mexican immigration laws and the decision to expel the plaintiff from
Mexico were within the scope of the defendant's official duties).
145 English v. Thorne, 676 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
140

141
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priest, Father Vance Zebulon Thomas. 146 The plaintiffs claim
sought to impose liability against the Vatican on grounds that
the Vatican "negligently employed, retained and reassigned
Thomas as pastor of The Holy Ghost Parish" and "breached
their fiduciary and professional duties and responsibilities to
the plaintiffs." 14 7 The Vatican raised the argument that subject
matter jurisdiction over these claims did not exist and moved to
dismiss.148 The court addressed the immunity issues under the
FSIA, specifically, whether any exceptions to the general rule of
immunity were met based on the claims asserted against the
defendant.149 The plaintiffs contended that their claims fell
50
within the non-commercial tortious exception to immunity.
The court addressed the plaintiffs argument against immunity
by first determining whether the FSIA's discretionary function
exception was met. In contrast to the plaintiffs attempts to
prove that the Vatican should be subject to suit, the court held
that it was "unable to discern any alleged conduct by the Vatican which does not involve the performance of a discretionary
function." 151 From a careful examination of the complaint, all of
the allegations were linked to the policies or procedures utilized
by the Vatican in the instruction and ordination of its priests.
The court held that these matters were "undeniably of a policymaking nature and clearly discretionary functions." 15 2 Thus,
the court concluded that the actions did not fall within the
1 53
FSIA's exception and subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.
Almost twenty years later, in the most recent case concerning the Vatican alleging similar complaints to that of English,
the plaintiffs did not limit their complaints solely to actions
taken by the Vatican. Rather, in Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese
of Galveston-Houston,1 5 4 the plaintiffs named the Pope as an individual defendant. Unlike in English, head of state immunity
became an issue by virtue of naming Pope Benedict XVI as a
Id.
Id. at 762.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 762-63.
150 Id. at 763.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 764.
153 Id. at 764.
154 Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F. Supp. 2d 272
(S.D. Tex. 2005).
146
147
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defendant. The underlying incident that led to this suit concerned the conduct of a Columbian seminarian, Juan Carlos Patino-Arango, who was training to become a priest at the St.
Francis de Sales Church in Houston, Texas. 155 The three
youths alleged that Patino recruited the young men to his
"counseling sessions" where he sexually abused them. 1 56 The
young men claimed that the priest boasted of his engagement in
similar behavior with other boys in the church and told the
young men not to report their encounters. 15 7 In naming the
Pope, the plaintiffs alleged that he assisted Patino in his flight
from Texas in order to avoid possible investigation and prosecution for the indicated sexual abuse. 158 Furthermore, the plaintiffs contended that the Archdiocese concealed the priest's
crimes and aided in the evasion of law enforcement so as to
15 9
comport with the directives from the Vatican.
What is unique to this case are the allegations against Pope
Benedict XVI. Pope Benedict XVI's involvement with this suit
does not stem from his action solely as Pope and head of the
Roman Catholic Church. Instead, the plaintiffs argued that his
position held prior to becoming Pope comprises the basis of the
chargeable actions in the sexual abuse allegations. 60 By doing
so, the case brought against Pope Benedict XVI is analogous to
the circumstances of In re Doe (discussed in Part III. A), where
the claims were based on actions that occurred during a time
period when Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos was not a
sitting head of state.1 6 1 In their suit against Pope Benedict
XVI, the plaintiffs challenged the Crimen Sollicitationis, also
known as the "Manner of Proceeding in Cases of Solicitation,"
which were letters published in 1962 by the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith.1 62 The Crimen, according to the
plaintiffs, outlines a trial manual governing how matters in
which priests are accused of sexual assault of children would be

157

See id.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 275.

158

Id.

155

156

Id.
See id. at 276.
The claims brought against Marcos were based upon his actions taken as a
former head of state. See In re Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1988).
162 Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 275-76.
159
160
161
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conducted. 163 The Crimen explains that such trials are led by a
secret Church tribunal, which ultimately sends the priest on a
pious pilgrimage and leaves the victim silenced under a papal
secret. 164 By referring to this letter as early as May 18, 2001,
when the Pope then held the title of Cardinal of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, rather than head of state of
the Holy See, the plaintiffs contended that this demonstrated
the Church's commitment to a history of concealment and conspiracy in a history of sexual abuse allegations by priests
against young men. 165 Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that the
2001 letter authored by Cardinal Ratzinger "is conspiratorial on
its face in that it reminds the archdioceses that clerical sexual
assault of minors is subject to exclusive clerical control and pontifical secrecy." 166 Along with another 2002 letter written by
Cardinal Ratzinger reminding United States' bishops that cooperation with civil authorities in cases of alleged child sexual
abuse was contrary to the Church's period of exclusive control
and secrecy over such matters, the plaintiffs' primary argument
behind the conspiracy claims were comprised of this powerful
evidence, which was not created at all during the Pope's
tenure.167
On December 22, 2005, the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas concluded that Pope Benedict XVI was immune from suit within the U.S. courts. 168 Prior to the court's
decision, the State Department heeded the Pope's request for
immunity and filed a suggestion of immunity on grounds that
the allowance of the lawsuit "would be incompatible with the
United States' foreign policy interest."169 In addition, the Pope
adopted the United States' suggestion of immunity and moved
to dismiss on various grounds, including lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 170 As a result of these pre-trial motions, at issue
before the court was whether the Pope's motion to dismiss
163

Id. at 276.

164

Id.

165

See id.

166

Id.

167

See id.
Id. at 282.

168

169 Pope's Immunity Affirmed; Court told to Dismiss Suit, JOURNAL GAZErE,
Sept. 21, 2005, at A8.
170 Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
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should be granted on grounds that he was immune. 17 1 The
plaintiffs argued that Pope Benedict XVI waived his immunity
defense by consenting to the removal of the lawsuit from state
to federal court. 17 2 However, the stronger argument raised by
the plaintiffs in favor of denying immunity concerned their contention that Pope Benedict XVI exceeded the authority granted
to him by Pope John Paul II at the time he was Cardinal and
not a head of state.1 73 The plaintiffs argued that as in Clinton
v. Jones,17 4 a sitting head of state may be haled into federal
court so as to account for the allegations brought against him at
a time when he did not hold office.' 75 Thus, the plaintiffs asserted that, because Pope Benedict XVI's actions were being
challenged during the time when he was Cardinal, head of state
76
immunity was inappropriately asserted.
The court granted Pope Benedict's motion to dismiss all
claims based on the court's recognition of a head of state's immunity and the judiciary's inability to make a ruling on the
merits of such an issue. 7 7 All pending motions were denied
and the plaintiffs ability to seek redress was foreclosed by the
jurisdictional bar created by the finding of head of state immunity. In addressing the plaintiffs' arguments, the court began
with the proposition that "under long established procedure, the
[Eixecutive [Branch makes a determination to grant immunity
to a head of state sued in the United States." 1 78 The court
firmly stated that the State Department's determination of immunity was not subject to review. 179 The court's opinion was
centered on the principle that foreign sovereign immunity decisions "are delicate, complex, and involve large amounts of
prophecy .... [They are decisions of a kind for which the Judi80
ciary has neither aptitude nor facilities nor responsibilities."1
See id.
Id. at 279.
173 Id. at 280.
174 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
175 Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F. Supp. 2d 272, 281
(S.D. Tex. 2005).
171
172

176

Id.

177
178

Id. at 282.
Id. at 278.

179

Id.

Id. at 278 (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948)).
180
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However, despite the dismissal of all claims, the court did not
ignore the head of state immunity issue raised by this suit.
In addressing the plaintiffs' argument that the Cardinal exceeded the authority granted to him in such position, the court
noted that "plaintiffs appear to raise an argument that would
be relevant to a qualified immunity analysis, such as that used
in assessing whether state actors . . . may be held liable for
their individual conduct that violates federally protected
rights." 18 ' This argument, although acknowledged by the court,
was ultimately struck down because it was solely limited to domestic immunity arguments and, thus, was "misplaced" under
the FSIA.182 Finally, the court held the fact that the plaintiffs'
claims against the Pope based on acts that he performed while
he was Cardinal were insignificant to the determination of the
head of state immunity issue.1 8 3 The court ultimately determined that the principles of foreign sovereign immunity apply
even if, at the time, the party did not hold such status during
84
the alleged wrongdoing.
The case brought against Pope Benedict XVI prompted the
court to address the head of state immunity arguments raised
by the plaintiffs as the claims specifically named the Pope as a
defendant. Yet, in responding to this issue, the court's primary
authority for wholly adhering to the absolute theory of head of
state immunity was based on cases that were decided before the
1976 adoption of the FSIA.' 8 5 In relying on these cases, it is
arguable that the court was ignorant of the evolving body of
case law that has developed which calls into question how head
of state immunity issues are resolved and whether immunity
suggestions are still the only source for deciding claims against
foreign heads of state.' 8 6 Moreover, the relevance of these cases
can be questioned in light of the thirty years that have transpired since the FSIA first codified a restrictive theory of sover181

Id. at 280.

182
183

Id.
Id. at 281.

184

Id.

Id. at 278 (citing Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) and Exparte
Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943)).
186 See, e.g., George, supra note 7, at 1068 (arguing that "the 'suggestion' of
immunity procedure for head-of-state immunity still presents the same problems
for the courts as it did during pre-FSIA sovereign immunity cases").
185
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eign immunity. As discussed above, head of state immunity
case law indicates that courts will typically conclude that the
pre-1976 theory of absolute immunity doctrine applies to heads
of states.' 8 7 However, because this theory is no longer relevant
to the resolution of foreign sovereign immunity given the FSIA's
restrictive theory, there is a need to align the resolution of head
of state immunity with that of the restrictive theory outlined in
the FSIA. Since immunity is a right derived from statehood,
courts have continuously espoused that it is the nature of the
activity that is omnipotent in moving a court to deny or grant
immunity.' 8 8 In resolving a claim brought against a foreign
sovereign, courts focus on the basis of the plaintiffs claims and
on whether they are of the type that a private person could engage in because they have no nexus to the sovereign. 8 9 If any
element of a specifically state-centered activity underlies the
plaintiffs claims, despite the gravity of the alleged acts, the illegal character of the alleged acts is irrelevant in judging their
non-sovereign character. 190 The statutory language governing
the FSIA's exception requires that the sovereign shield be
pierced and there is some nexus between this private activity
and its effects on United States plaintiffs seeking redress.
Moreover, under the FSIA's discretionary function provision,
courts must account for a variety of factors including the causes
of actions alleged and whether there is a strong relationship between the sovereign's behavior and whether this action was one
grounded in the sovereign's "social, economic, or political
policy."' 9 '
The question remains how to make the head of state immunity doctrine settled so that it is aligned with the rationale behind the larger concept of restrictive foreign sovereign
immunity that was incorporated into the FSIA. Scholars have
suggested amending the FSIA to specifically include heads of
state under the broad definition of foreign sovereigns.1 92 Villa187 See, e.g., Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff'd, 408
F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
188 See, e.g., Cicippio v. Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1994).
189 Id.
190 See generally, Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000).
191 See Alicog v. Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
192 See Mallory, supra note 7, at 187-88. She suggests that by including the
term head of state under the FSIA's definitional section, without consideration of
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nova University School of Law Professor Joseph Dellapenna
noted that this method would be the simplest means for resolving the uncertainty surrounding head of state immunity. 1 93 He
continued that it was possible for courts by themselves to
achieve the same result through their own interpretation and
application of the FSIA and whether, at times, a head of state
may or may not qualify as a foreign state. 194 This would allow
the head of state's immunity to be denied when, like a foreign
sovereign statehood, the action does not derive from his public
duty. By allowing foreign heads of states to enjoy the presumption of immunity under the FSIA unless one of the statutory
exceptions is met, courts would have a standard to adequately
address what truly is a jurisdictional question. Both the British
and Canadian statutes follow this procedure and include heads
of state within foreign sovereign immunity. 9 5
Although the British and Canadian statutes state that the
immunities and privileges conferred by their sovereign immunity acts apply to the "sovereign or other head of the state in his
public capacity," it appears that the United States' FSIA should
not merely have a blanket provision including heads of state
within its provisions. 19 6 Rather, this Comment suggests that
what would be most conducive to enabling the courts to address
a head of state immunity issue is if the FSIA contained a separate enumerated exception under the FSIA that applies only to
foreign heads of state. The exception would be crafted similarly
to the language of the FSIA's commercial activity provision such
that the type of claim that the plaintiffs action is based on bethe State Department's suggestion of immunity, the FSIA should be amended to

account for heads of state like foreign sovereigns and would also be subject to the
specific FSIA exceptions. See id.; See also Joseph W. Dellapenna, Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative Perspective, 88 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 509, 514 (1994).
193 See Dellapenna, Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative Perspective, supra
note 192, at 514.
194 See id.
195 Cf State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 14(1) (Eng.). This statute provides
that "the immunities and privileges conferred by this Part of this Act apply to any
foreign or commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom; and references to
a State include references to - (a) a sovereign or other head of that State in his
with State Immunity Act, R.S.C., c. S-18, s. 2.2 (1985). This
public capacity ....
statute provides that "foreign state" includes "any sovereign or other head of the
foreign state or of any political subdivision of the foreign state while acting as such
in a public capacity." Id.
196 Id.
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comes a significant focus of the court's analysis under a more
restrictive head of state immunity doctrine. The focus under
this statutory exception would then shift to linking the cause of
action brought against the head of state with the nature of his
conduct in light of his official duties taken during a time when
he was in office. It would require courts to balance the gravity
of the claim asserted against the foreign head-of-state with
whether the actions that form the foundation of the claims are
largely based on actions that were the result of decisions stemming from their official capacities. As indicated from the above
discussed case law which named foreign heads of states and
governmental officials as defendants, 19 7 the courts have already
indicated that they are well suited to account for the unique circumstances of each case brought against such individuals and
the nature of the particular claims alleged. Further, the courts
have already created a head of state immunity dialogue when
addressing this issue, 198 but now require the authority so that
binding precedent can exist in this area of law. By assuring
that the statutory exception applicable to heads of state identifies the type of claims that warrant a denial of immunity, the
relationship between the head of state's official duties and the
acts he took in carrying out those duties will be central to the
court's determination of whether piercing the shield of immunity is truly warranted based upon the gravamen of the plaintiffs claims.
The strongest argument against allowing the judiciary to
address the head of state immunity issue was restated by the
District Court in Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of GalvestonHouston.' 99 The court, citing 1974's Spacil v. Crowe, 20 0 held
that "the executive's determination is not subject to additional
review by a federal court." 20 1 The majority of the court's opinion in the case against Pope Benedict XVI relied on the separa197 See generally Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affd,
408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005); Leutwyler v. Office of Her Majesty Queen Rania AlAbdullah, 184 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
198 See, e.g., A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(stating that courts in "dictum" have recognized that head of state immunity may
not extend to a former head of state's private acts).
199 Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F. Supp. 2d 272
(S.D. Tex. 2005).
200 See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974).
201 Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
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tion of powers argument that prevents the judiciary from ever
addressing head of state immunity questions because such a
role belongs solely to the Executive Branch. 20 2 The language
used by the court in Spacil no longer seems applicable in the
context of the FSIA's restrictive immunity theory.
Separation-of-powers principles impel a reluctance in the judiciary to interfere with or embarrass the executive in its constitutional role as the nation's primary organ of international policy.
And the degree to which granting or denying a claim of immunity
may be important to foreign policy is a question on which the judiciary is particularly ill-equipped to second-guess the executive.
The executive's institutional resources and expertise in foreign affairs far outstrip those of the judiciary. 20 3
Moreover, where acts undertaken by a head of state lack any
nexus to the sovereign, applying the language of Chief Justice
Marshall a suit comprised of actions which are not "under the
immediate and direct command of the sovereign" 20 4 will result
in minimal interference with his power and dignity.
The case involving Pope Benedict XVI provides an illustration of how the judiciary is best suited to address the multifaceted circumstances of a head of state immunity issue.
Some of the causes of actions brought against the Pope included
breach of confidential relationships, fraudulent concealment,
and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal.205 By first identifying
the types of claims brought against the Pope in light of the language of FSIA's statutory exceptions, the court would be
prompted as it is under the commercial and non-commercial
tort exceptions to consider the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint. In doing so, the court is able to address the nature of the
conduct in which the head of state is accused of engaging and
whether this behavior can be traced to his official duties. In the
Pope's case, the causes of actions involve his role as leader of
the Holy See and appear to be tied to his official duties, but
these actions occurred at the time when he was not yet leader of
the Roman Catholic Church. 2 06 Similar to a court's finding that
202
203
204

205
206

Id. at 279-81.
Spacil, 489 F.2d at 619.
See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 144 (1812).
Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
See id. at 274-75.
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a private party could engage in the very type of behavior that
forms the basis of the plaintiffs complaint against a foreign sovereign, the court itself can begin by applying this foundational
question behind the restrictive immunity concept of the FSIA to
the behavior of the head of state. Moreover, consideration of
both the Pope's role at the time of the alleged abuse and the
nexus between his actions and their direct effect on the United
States plaintiffs, are factors that the court could weigh as part
of its ultimate decision on whether subject matter jurisdiction
over such claims exist.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although resolution of a head of state immunity issue is
less clear than one involving only a foreign sovereign, the judiciary has implicitly adopted the role of clarifying the confusion
and proceeded to determine this issue themselves. Courts continuously cite the principles of the Schooner Exchange when addressing a head of state immunity question. 20 7 These principles
remain viable today and provide the authority for the courts to
make the distinction between the public and private acts in
which a head of state engages and, where appropriate, warrant
a finding of subject matter jurisdiction over claims tied to those
private acts. By providing for a separate statutory exception
under the FSIA, the courts would be able to account for the multitude of factors that affect a finding of jurisdiction when addressing a head of state immunity issue; such factors include
the nature of the claim and the link between the cause of action
and the duties of a sitting head of state, and uphold the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. 2 08 Despite the potentially grave ramifications that could result from haling a head
of state overseas to submit to the jurisdiction over the particular claims brought within American courts, the doctrines of
comity and sovereign dignity will not be hindered. 20 9 By allowing courts alone to hear claims involving a head of state who
207

See, e.g., Enohoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (Ill. 2005); Zemin, 282 F.

Supp. 2d 875.

See, e.g., Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
See George, supra note 7, at 1069 (arguing that the courts are the "appropriate body to make determinations of immunity because the State Department is
subject to greater political pressures in issuing these determinations").
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529

has acted outside the scope of his official capacities, this setting
appears the most apt to ensure that an adequate remedy exists
for a domestic plaintiff when the circumstances satisfy the
FSIA's separate head of state exception.
The language of the nearly two hundred year old Schooner
Exchange case is embedded in the FSIA. The concept of foreign
sovereign immunity exists to protect the true sovereign. However, the interests of justice and the ability for plaintiffs whose
actions are premised on common law causes of actions or even
grave offenses that do not involve the sovereign's use of police
power warrant the grant of subject matter jurisdiction over
such claims. When Judge Evans remarked in Abubakar that an
American courtroom was an unlikely place to hear the torture
and murder claims of Nigerians suing the Nigerian government, his words should not be interpreted to mean that American courts are forever foreclosed to plaintiffs. Rather, long
before the courtroom is the appropriate setting for such actions,
the judiciary possesses the tools to first answer when, if at all,
head of state claims can even proceed inside an American
courtroom.
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